Many of these countries from the Global South have refused to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, they are seeking to bolster the 120-strong Non-Aligned Movement, which emerged from the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and African governments. As part of a strategy to avoid becoming embroiled in superpower conflicts (between the Americans and the Soviets, at the time), NAM members abstained from collective defence arrangements with either side. This weapon of the weak lent momentum to efforts to enhance regional autonomy and strengthen global-governance institutions such as the United Nations, and it may yet do so again.

Finally, as of this writing, Israel’s siege and bombardment of Gaza in response to Hamas’s attack (which killed 1,400 Israelis) has resulted in more than 9,000 dead and 1.4 million displaced Palestinians. Unquestioning Western support for Israel will expose the double standards at the heart of the international system, further weakening global support for Ukraine in 2024.

Adekeye Adebajo is a senior research fellow at the University of Pretoria’s Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship.

Ian Bremmer

Yes, the international trend towards “non-alignment” will continue in 2024. But “multipolarity” is a different question, one that depends on which arena of competition we’re thinking about.

In 2024, non-alignment for many countries will mean recognizing that overtly taking sides in the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China is a losing proposition. Some governments, particularly those in countries situated near China or Russia, will see the US as an indispensable security partner. But commercial partnership with China remains essential for future growth.

“Multipolarity” is a more complex question. In the security sphere, we still live in a unipolar world. Only the US can project power into every region of the world. China’s military clout is growing, but—importantly—it hasn’t been tested by a shooting war in more than four decades. Russia’s conventional forces were hollow even before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine inflicted generational damage on its military capacity. And Europe still relies on the US, as do US allies in Asia.

In the economic arena, however, we’re certainly living in a multipolar world, one in which America, China, Europe, and India are all crucial players in re-establishing the stability and dynamism of the global economy. Then there’s the digital realm, where the power of governments is limited by the power of the tech companies that produce the advances that political officials are scrambling to understand. Here, one finds an emerging “technopolar” world, where governments and tech companies will share power for the foreseeable future.

Put these trends together, and non-alignment is the wave of the future.

Ian Bremmer is founder and president of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media.

Stephen G. Brooks

Multipolarity is a myth, as William Wohlforth and I argued recently in Foreign Affairs (which also published a symposium of responses to our article). The United States has indeed become less dominant than in the 1990s, when it was further ahead militarily, economically, and technologically than any state had ever been before. But a multipolar world is one with three or more roughly equally matched leading powers at the top of the international heap. Who could fill that role today? Of all the countries that could plausibly rank third—France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom—none is even roughly a peer of the US or China.

Not only is multipolarity a myth, but the system remains closer to unipolarity than to Cold War-style bipolarity. Though China is rising, the world’s largest-ever power gap will take a long time to close. China has ascended most significantly in the economic domain (although less than is commonly assumed, since it significantly inflates its GDP data), but it has done much less to shrink the power gap in other areas. It still lags very far behind the US technologically. A forthcoming (co-authored) book of mine shows that US firms hold a 53% profit share in high-tech industries, compared with a mere 6% for China. China is also only a regional military power, and that will long remain the case, leaving the US as the sole superpower that can command the global commons.

Stephen G. Brooks is professor of government at Dartmouth College and a guest professor at Stockholm University.

Paula J. Dobriansky

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered significant geopolitical changes. The war, combined with rising US-China tensions, has unified the transatlantic community and prompted many Indo-Pacific governments to bolster their defences and secure their supply chains. The same developments have also encouraged political leaders across the Global South to pursue “optionality,” making choices predicated on their national interests, while doing what they can to avoid becoming mired in great-power disputes.

Today’s ongoing geopolitical changes include new or closer national alignments—from Russia’s deepening ties with China, Iran, and North Korea, to Australia’s engagement with India and Indonesia, and with the United States and the United Kingdom under AUKUS. While the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the US (established in 2007) has become more ambitious, other powers have taken pains to thwart emerging new alignments. Many view Hamas’s latest attack on Israel as an attempt to block Saudi-Israeli normalization, which could have threatened not only Hamas but also its sponsors in Iran.

America’s messy 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan contributed to this evolution in the international system by undermining perceptions of US credibility, reliability, and effectiveness. That, in turn, caused some leaders (like Russian President Vladimir Putin) to re-evaluate the costs of pursuing policies contrary to US interests. These changes in preference and perspective have facilitated not only new violence but also new or different relationships as America’s allies, rivals, and foes recalibrate their goals. Similarly, Russia’s faltering war effort in Ukraine appears to have created a more permissive environment for Azerbaijan’s conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. New wars and the desire to avoid being drawn into US-Russia-China conflicts will continue to drive the new multipolarity and the return of non-alignment.

Paula J. Dobriansky is a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Jorge Heine

In 2024, the great-power competition will continue, as will the rise of non-alignment, albeit now in a new incarnation: active non-alignment (ANA). Originally triggered by American and Chinese pressure on Latin American countries to take sides in their budding cold war, ANA is now spreading across Africa and Asia. It takes a page from the Non-Aligned Movement of yesteryear, but adapts it to the realities of the new century.

ANA should not be confused with neutrality or equidistance. Rather, it is a dynamic concept that allows countries to hold varying positions depending on the issue at hand. As a foreign-policy doctrine, it means putting the interests of one’s own country first, and not succumbing to pressure by the great powers. It requires highly developed analytical capabilities, so that each issue can be evaluated on its own merits.

The rise of ANA has become especially apparent in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with many countries across the Global South refusing to take sides. This development shows that the main cleavage in today’s world is not between democracy and autocracy, but between the Global North and the Global South. ANA’s spread is closely associated with the rise of the Global South as a significant force in world affairs, of which the recent expansion of the Brics is Exhibit A. The best example of it in practice is Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s foreign policy over the course of 2023.

Jorge Heine is a research professor at Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies.

Ana Palacio

If recent events are any indication, the world is indeed hastening toward a realignment. Russia’s war in Ukraine, ethnic displacement in Nagorno-Karabakh, the string of coups in Africa, and the crisis in the Middle East are all signs of the disruption of the world order that emerged after World War II. These events are not outliers or isolated crises. With the United States somewhat removed and less assertive than in the past, countries and non-state actors feel emboldened to take risks and seize opportunities that they previously would have shied away from.

The current moment is characterized by an alphabet soup of new coalitions that have formed in response to changing global power dynamics. The expanding Brics+ is just one example among many. With middle powers increasingly vying for global influence, we have entered an age of disorder that will last until a new configuration of international relations solidifies.

Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain, is a visiting lecturer at Georgetown.

Yu Jie

I agree. As myriad crises and elections unfold, 2024 is set to be another geopolitically tumultuous year. But it also offers opportunities for non-Western powers that champion “neutrality” and “non-alignment” to play greater roles in global affairs. Most of these countries, including China, base their foreign-policy priorities on hard calculations of economic or political interests, whereas the collective West stresses the importance of “being likeminded”.

This state of play cannot fail to create greater multipolarity. Pragmatism will demand that many countries pick a side depending on the issue at hand. While “neutrality” will remain unthinkable from G7 members’ perspective—whether they are dealing with relations with China or the war between Israel and Hamas—many non-Western powers will consider it de rigueur in conducting their foreign affairs.

For its part, China will continue to shift the rest of the world towards greater multipolarity, since it sees that as the best way to manage its stalemate vis-à-vis the United States. While China’s initial position on Russia’s war in Ukraine worsened its ties with many Western countries, attitudes within the West have since become more nuanced. There is now a strange mix of fear that China will aid the Kremlin militarily, but also hope that it will limit President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship.

Given that many countries around the world do not view today’s geopolitical crises in stark black-and-white terms, China may find that its preference for multipolarity is becoming more of an asset.

Yu Jie is a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House.

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Published: 31 Dec 2023, 10:00 PM IST